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I. PREMISE
Assume that you are the dictator of a small country
adjacent to a prosperous first world nation. You have little
interaction with this nation because it objects to the manner
in which you maintain control of the dissidents in your
country. However, there are internal policies of the
prosperous nation that, if changed, could bring an
economic windfall to your country. The policies could be
as mundane as a tariff or as expansive as an embargo.
Since this prosperous nation refuses to negotiate (at least
until you stop jailing and torturing dissidents), and since
using military force would surely result in your own
destruction, you are in a bit of a bind. But wait!
As with many dictatorships, yours has engendered
its share of political refugees. It is hard not to when you
torture and jail people for their political beliefs.
Furthermore, the end of the Cold War dried up the
superpower largesse, and your country is economically
bereft; another motivator for your fleeing citizens.
Perhaps the state of affairs is not all bad! Perhaps
you could harness these refugees. Perhaps they could
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unwittingly be used to serve your policy goals. They
could be used to influence other nations just as surely as
those old tanks you've got that are beginning to fall apart.
Yes, I think you're on to something. You will
encourage refugees to cross the border. Instead of jailing
them for trying to leave, you will open the gates. Sure,
you know you will lose a lot of people (including, perhaps,
many of those damn dissidents), but you cannot be
expected to guarantee another country's borders, can you?
Once the problem reaches crisis status in the
bordering nation, you can offer to assist them by restoring
previous measures to prevent escapes. Of course, there
would have to be some sort of quid pro quo. You cannot
be expected to guard another nation's borders for nothing.
If only the prosperous nation would change those
policies that have been vexing you so. Lower that tariff.
Stop building settlements. Offer some aid. You are sure it
can all be worked out.
The arguments have been increasing for humanitarian intervention
in states which violate international law regarding human rights abuses.'
Such human rights abuses are abhorrent, and states responsible for them
should be held accountable. But there is an even greater threat than the
senseless abuse taking place because of internal power struggles or
political differences.
In today's post-Cold War world, small totalitarian nations no
longer have the bargaining chips to convince the larger, more prosperous
nations to adopt policies that would provide these smaller nations with
1. Two excellent aricles confirming the legality of recent humanitarian interventions by the
U.N. in Somalia and the Balkans are Marc M. Boutin, Somalia: The Legality of U.N. Forcible
Humanitarian Intervention, 17 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REV. 138 (1994) and David M.
Kresock, "Ethnic Cleansing' in the Balkans: The Legal Foundations of Foreign Intervention, 27
CORNELL INT'L L.J. 203 (1994). Another excellent survey article is by Richard Lillich, The
Role of the UN Security Council in Protecting Human Rights in Crisis Situations: UN
Humanitarian Intervention in the Post-Cold War World, 3 TUL. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 1 (1995).
For interesting articles on the extreme edge of humanitarian intervention, including intervention
to restore the right of self-determination as expressed through democratic government, and the
intriguing view that humanitarian interventions constitute war see Lois E. Fielding, Taking the
Next Step in the Development of New Human Rights: The Emerging Right of Humanitarian
Assistance to Restore Democracy, 5 DUKE J. COMP. & INT'L L. 329 (1995); W. Michael
Reisman, Humanitarian Intervention and Fledgling Democracies, 18 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 794
(1995); and Byron F. Burmester, On Humanitarian Intervention: The New World Order and
Wars to Preserve Human Rights, 1994 UTAH L. REV. 269 (1994).
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needed benefits.2 Having seen that refugees are one of the prime problems
vexing the more prosperous nations,' totalitarian nations have found ways
to exploit the refugee situation. Using the refugees as tools of foreign
policy gives nations back a measure of the leverage they lost with the end
of the Cold War.
Unfortunately, such actions are not clearly prohibited by
international law. Yet, by using multilateral treaties and resolutions an
argument can be made that such actions are already prohibited under
international law. This article will suggest ways in which the world
community might prevent such situations from occurring in the future.
As a case study for the proposals, we shall look at the actions
taken by Cuba during August 1994. During that time, Cuba, a repressive
dictatorship with a long record of human rights abuses and refugees,
opened its borders. This permitted a flood of refugees to spill into its
economically prosperous neighbor, the United States. In return for halting
the exodus, Cuba insisted that the United States lift the embargo of goods
to and from Cuba. Even though Cuba did not succeed, its actions did win
some concessions, namely a revised immigration policy in the United
States. The danger is that this limited success might spur other nations in
Cuba's situation, such as North Korea or Iraq, to attempt similar coercive
acts. Cuba should be held accountable under international law for using
refugees as tools of foreign policy. By doing nothing, the world
encourages repressive states to cultivate refugees, if only to be utilized in
achieving foreign policy goals. The world may not be ready to step in and
remedy human rights violations for their own sake, but the world should at
least recognize a self-defense interest in a nation which is being purposely
flooded by refugees from another state as part of that state's conduct of its
foreign affairs.
2. While Egypt is probably the most obvious example of a nation that played the
superpowers against each other, states such as Israel, Nicaragua, Cuba, the former Eastern
European Soviet satellite states and, in fact, just about every state in the world, used the
superpower rivalry to reap monetary benefits.
3. For example, Germany has been dealing with more than 400,000 refugees from the
Balkan crisis. Germany has had problems in the past with integrating refugees into its society,
including Kurdish and East European refugees. For a breakdown of states that have accepted
Balkan refugees, see Mary Williams Walsh. Germany May Repatriate Bosnian Refugees, L.A.
TIMES, Dec. 23, 1995, at AI0. For information on how refugees have forced changes in German
laws, and how revised refugee policies have had a domino affect on other nations see [gal
Avidan, Refugees-Germany: Facts, Figures, and Costs Behind Policy, INTER PRESS SERV.
GLOBAL INFO. NETWORK, July 20, 1993, and Germany Pulls Welcome Mat From Refugees; In a
Domino Effect, Other Countries Are Preparing Their Own Restrictions, ASSOCIATED PRESS, July
1, 1993.
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II. FACTS
The origin of the Cuban refugee crisis can be traced to 1959, when
a totalitarian regime took power. Since 1959, over 800,000 Cubans have
left Cuba for the United States. Many Cubans opposed to the government
left Cuba when the revolution occurred. Yet, many stayed behind.
However, as the harshness of the new regime became apparent, many
more tried to escape. Since the United States is so close to Cuba, it was
the destination of choice for those trying to escape.
Two boatlifts preceded the events of 1994; the Camarioca Boatlift
of 1965 and the well known Mariel Boatlift of 1980. The former was
small, in a relative sense; only 5000 refugees arrived in the United States
before the Cuban government agreed to an airlift that permitted 268,000
Cubans into the United States between 1965 and 1973.1 The Mariel
Boatlift brought over 125,000 Cuban refugees to the United States before
anything happened.4 Following an incident in which 10,000 people took
refuge in the Peruvian Embassy, Castro announced that any Cuban who
wished to leave the country could do so through the port of Mariel.. The
Cuban government controlled the exodus directly. They determined who
departed on which boats. They even added criminals and the mentally ill
to the ranks of those departing.
It is against this background that 1994s Cuban refugee flight can
be measured. The flash point for this latest mass exodus was the sinking
of the tugboat, the "13' of March," on July 13, 1994.' The Cuban
government claimed that the sinking was accidental and that they were just
using the water cannons to try and stop the boat's engines. However,
survivors claim that the boat was pummeled by the water cannons from
three of the governments tugs and then rammed by one of the vessels. The
115 year old wooden boat sunk with sixty-eight passengers aboard.'
Thirty-seven of the passengers drowned, while thirty-one were picked up
by Cuban gunboats which observed the events.9 In the three weeks
following this incident, three passenger ferries were hijacked, along with
an airplane and a military vessel.'0
4. Exodus From Cuba, DEP'T ST. BULL., July 1980, at 80.
5. Ronald Copeland, The Cuban Boatlifi of 1980: Strategies in Crisis Management, 467
ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SC. 138, 140 (1983).
6. Id. at 139.
7. Tod Robberson, Story of Tug's Sinking Incited Cubans; Drownings That Launched
Exodus of Rafters May Be Portent, WASH. POST, Sept. 11, 1994, at Al.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Id.
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These events led to a riot in Havana on August 5, 1994." Rumors
that a ferry boat was going to be hijacked to Florida drew more than five
hundred people to the Havana docks, and the first anti-government riot
since Castro assumed power occurred. Two police officials were killed, a
third injured, and several hotels and dollars-only shops were damaged."
Castro answered the riot by declaring, through the government
news agency Prensa Latina, that "we will stop blocking the departure of
those who want to leave the country,"" and that "we cannot continue to
guard the coasts of the United States. " 4
With those words the spigot opened. Flight from Cuba, an activity
formally punishable by a prison sentence, morphed into one condoned by
the Cuban government. By August 24, 1994, rafters were departing from
the Havana waterfront, "in full view of government office buildings and
large crowds of onlookers. "' In all, more than 32,000 would depart."
The United States responded by sending Coast Guard ships to pick
up many of the rafters at sea. But as the number of refugees climbed into
the thousands arriving daily, 7 the United States reversed a thirty year old
policy of granting Cuban refugees asylum." The Clinton Administration
first barred direct entry into the United States on August 19, 1994, stating
that refugees picked up at sea would be detained at Guantanamo Naval
Base located, ironically enough, in Cuba." Then, on September 1, 1994,
Clinton began talks which culminated in a revised United States
immigration policy.Y This policy was altered even further in a Joint
Statement on May 2, 1995.2'  With fears of another summer exodus
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. John Rice, Castro Threatens to Allow Refugees to Flood Out, ASSOCIATED PRESS,
Aug. 5, 1994.
14. Id.
15. Roberto Suro, Havana Giving Tacit Approval to Rising Tide of Rafters, WASH. POST,
Aug. 24, 1994, at A24.
16. For a daily breakdown of the number of refugees picked up at sea, see Daniel
Williams, Cuba Deal Depends on Castro Dropping Trade Demands, WASH. POST, Sept. 9, 1994,
at A34.
17. Id.
18. Michael Dobbs, Lawmakers Assail New Policy On Returning Cuban Refugees, WASH.
POST, May 19, 1995, at AS.
19. President Clinton's Press Conference Remarks, 5 U.S. DEP'T ST. DISPATCH 35 (1994).
20. U.S.-Cuba Joint Communique on Migration, 5 U.S. DEP'T ST. DISPATCH 37 (1994).
21. Joint Statement with the Republic of Cuba on Normalization of Migration, 31 WKLY
COMP. PRESIDENTIAL DOC. 752, May 2, 1995 [hereinafter Joint Statement with the Republic of
Cuba].
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growing, the Clinton Administration announced that refugees would
henceforth be returned to Cuba.22 These announcements were met by large
scale demonstrations by the Cuban exile population, as well as causing
considerable strife amongst United States Congressional Representatives."
Yet, on Wednesday, May 10, 1995, the Coast Guard followed the new
policy as thirteen Cubans picked up at sea were returned to the island.
The costs of this crisis were enormous. The Pentagon estimated it
will have spent 52 million dollars in physical improvements to the
Guantanamo base, 10 million dollars a month to provide food and sundries
for the refugees, 93 thousand dollars a day to charter a ship where extra
military personnel reside, and 1.3 million for extra security patrols. Add
those costs to the 44 million dollars the United States spent in temporarily
transferring an overflow of 7450 refugees to Panama, and the United
States spent a total of well over 100 million dollars, not including costs
incurred by the Coast Guard for the rescue operation itself or by the
Immigration and Naturalization Service for processing the refugees.24
From these facts two conclusions can be drawn. First, the Cuban
government knew its actions would trigger a massive departure to the
United States. The Cuban government used this tactic before to serve its
political goals, such as ridding itself of political "undesirables," and
exporting its criminals and mentally ill to the United States. Now, the
Cuban government had a different agenda, but it stuck with a proven
tactic.
The second conclusion is that the actions taken by Cuba had large
scale political and economic repercussions within the United States. When
we turn to an examination of the relevant multinational documents, we
must bear these costs in mind.
III. CUBA'S POSITION
During the 1994 crisis, high ranking members of the Cuban
government made explicit demands for an end to the United States trade
embargo "5 and for an alteration of United States immigration policies as
22. See U.S.-Cuba, Joint Communique on Migration, supra note 20.
23. Dobbs, supra note 18, at A8.
24. Douglas Farah, U.S. Begins Flying Cuban Refugees in Panama to Guantanamo Naval
Base, WASH. POST, Feb. 2, 1995, at A18; Dana Priest, Pentagon May Employ Others to Watch
Refugees, WASH. POST, Mar. 6, 1995, at A9.
25. Roberto Suro, Havana Giving Tacit Approval to Rising Tide of Rafters, WASH. POST,
Aug. 24, 1994, at A24.
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precursors to halting the flow of refugees.2' Such demands took many
forms.
As early in the crisis as the August 5, 1994 riots, Fidel Castro
stated the Cuban government would "stop guarding the coast of the United
States," 7 unless the United States ceased provocations.'2
On August 23, 1994, Jose Cabanas, a senior Cuban Foreign
Ministry official who heads a department dealing with Cuban migrant
communities in other nations, indicated that "the fundamental cause [of the
exodus] is the blockade against Cuba."' Cabanas was referring, in more
accurate parlance, to the United States embargo, and that Cuba was
waiting for "agile and clear measures"" from the United States.' Castro
acknowledged in an August 24th speech that as early as August l1th he
had stated, "[to] go to the bottom of the problem means to discuss the
blockade. "I2
During the official negotiations, which began September 1, 1994,
Ricardo Alarcon, a Cuban diplomat and former foreign minister, was
interviewed on Nightline.3 ' He stated that while Cuba was willing to
discuss immigration issues, the uncontrolled migration to the United States
would not end without talks of a broader political scope. 4 Referring to the
United States negotiating position (dealing only with immigration issues),
Alarcon stated, "[I] am not convinced by the promises [on migration]. It
should be part of a strategic change, a foreign policy change."" Alarcon
went on to talk about the benefits to be gained in Cuba if the embargo by
the United States was discontinued.? During these talks, Alarcon also
pressed for the United States to force private radio stations in Florida to
cease broadcasting to Cuba.37 Finally, the Cuban government demanded
26. Id.
27. John Rice, Castro Threats Over Emigration Brings New Cuban Crisis to the U.S.,
ASSOCIATED PRESS, Aug. 7, 1994, at A70.
28. Id.
29. Suro, supra note 15.
30. Id.
31. Id.
32. CNN News Live Report, (CNN, Aug. 24, 1994), available in 1994 WL 3678276.
33. Daniel Williams, Diplomat Encourages Talk About Embargo, WASH. POST, Sept. 4,
1994, at A44.
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
1996]
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that the United States change its immigration policy., These demands
included granting entry to a "backlog"39 of 140,000 Cubans, who Cuba
claimed should have been permitted to enter the United States under a
1984 joint agreement.40
IV. CONCESSIONS GRANTED
The Cuban government succeeded in its attempts to alter United
States policies. Although Cuba did not achieve the elimination of the
embargo, it gained other valuable concessions. The most obvious
concession was the revised United States immigration policy. Yet, perhaps
the most important concession was that Cuba established a new pattern of
threats and coercive acts, which were followed by conciliation and
negotiation through which it might attain future goals.
Under the December 14, 1984 Joint Communique on
Immigration,"l the United States agreed to issue up to 20,000 preference
visas to Cuban nationals residing in Cuba. In return, Cuba agreed to
accept "excludables' 2 from the Mariel immigrants. This group consisted
of those individuals who normally would have not been allowed to
immigrate to the United States because of their criminal records.43  This
Joint Communique was the Act which Cuba accused the United States of
violating because, although the agreement provided for up to 20,000
Cubans to be admitted yearly, only 11,000 visas were issued under the
program."
Under the September 9, 1994 United States-Cuba Joint
Communique on Migration,'5 that ceiling of 20,000 visas was changed into
a floor." A minimum of 20,000 visas would be issued to Cuban nationals,
but this figure would not include immediate relatives of United States
38. Daniel Williams, Cuba Deal Depends on Castro Dropping Trade Demands. Officials
Say, WASH. POST, Sept. 9, 1994, at A34.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Joint Communique Between The United States of America and Cuba, Dec. 14, 1984,
U.S.-Cuba, T.I.A.S. No. 11,057 [hereinafter Joint Communique Between the United States and
Cubal.
42. Id.
43. Individuals who had only committed "offenses against the Security of the State" were
not included in this "excludable" category. See Joint Communique Between The United States
and Cuba, supra note 41.
44. Daniel Williams, Cuban Response to U.S. Immigration Offer "Outlandish", WASH.
POST, Sept. 5, 1994, at A34.
45. U.S.-Cuba Joint Communique on Migration, supra note 20.
46. Id.
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citizens."' As an additional measure, the United States agreed to a one
year period during which it would issue permits to all qualified Cuban
nationals who were then on the immigrant visa waiting list."
In addition to these changes in immigration policy, the September
9, 1994 Agreement contained a reversal of the thirty year old American
policy of automatically paroling Cuban refugees into the United States.
The agreement set forth this policy change in two prongs. First, the
United States provided that all "migrants rescued at sea attempting to enter
the United States will not be permitted to enter the United States, but
instead will be taken to safe haven facilities outside the United States.""
The second prong "discontinued the [United States] practice of granting
parole to all Cuban migrants who reach U.S. territory in irregular ways."'
In return, the Cuban government promised to take effective measures in
every way possible to prevent unsafe departures, using mainly persuasive
methods.'
In the May 2, 1995 Joint Statement with the Republic of Cuba on
Normalization of Migration, 2 the Cuban government obtained more
concessions. The United States agreed to parole the refugees ensconced at
Guantanamo into the United States." The United States also agreed that
"Cuban migrants intercepted at sea by the United States and attempting to
enter the United States will be taken to Cuba."14 Though it might be of
scant comfort to those forcibly repatriated, the two governments also
agreed to inform returnees of the official procedures by which Cubans
might apply for admission to the United States at the United States
Interests Section in Havana." Cuba's concession in this agreement was to
"ensure that no action is taken against those migrants returned to Cuba as a
consequence of their attempt to immigrate illegally."
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Williams, supra note 33.
52. Joint Statement with the Republic of Cuba, supra note 21.
53. d.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
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V. CUBA'S VIOLATIONS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
Cuba's actions violated two distinct categories of international law.
The first can be described as violating the right of a sovereign state. Cuba
violated these rights by deliberately attempting to influence the internal
policies of the United States through coercive measures, specifically by
flooding the United States with refugees.
The second body of international law which Cuba violated through
its actions involved the rights of individuals, commonly known as human
rights. Cuba has a long history of such violations; yet, its actions in
promoting and dealing with refugees constitute clear violations of major
multinational and regional human rights accords. Each of these violations
will be discussed in turn.
United Nations Charter article 2(4) provides that all Member
States "shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of
force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state,
or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United
Nations. "51 Cuba's attempts to influence a range of internal United States
policies, including the embargo, radio broadcasting, and immigration,
certainly constitutes a threat to the political independence of the United
States. A nation which is being coerced into policy shifts can hardly be
said to be politically independent.
The territory of the United States was also violated. Thousands of
Cubans streamed toward the United States in an attempt to enter. Only the
use of United States military forces prevented the violation of its borders
en masse; and those refugees who did reach the United States on their rafts
violated the nation's territorial integrity. This exodus was at least tacitly,
if not actively, encouraged by the government of Cuba.
The only question appears to be whether or not there was the
threat or use of force. Is it farfetched to analogize the promotion of a
large number of refugees to an invasion force? Both can cause g reat
damage and costs within the country targeted. Both can be used for the
same ends: the alteration of another nation's internal policies. The only
difference appears to be the potential for the loss of human life, and in this
Cuban scenario, this holds true only for the invading nation. The Cuban
force of refugees certainly had the greatest potential for the loss of their
lives during their perilous raft crossing of the Straits of Florida.
The U.N. Charter was written at a time when the use of force was,
if not accepted, at the least not clearly outlawed. The Charter's purpose
57. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, para. 4.
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was to outlaw war and the violent acts which might lead to war.- To a
degree, it has been successful. Yet, the Charter suffers from the learning
curve, as does any statute. Clever lawbreakers will find new methods to
achieve the same goals. (Especially since the use of force was thwarted,
and roundly condemned by the example the world set in reversing Iraq's
invasion of Kuwait.) Yet when an invasion of refugees is used to
accomplish the same ends as an invasion of soldiers, and in fact can be
more successful because of the absence of the possibility of military defeat,
it is only logical to hold such states to the same standards of international
conduct.
The rights of states to be free of the external influence of other
states is stated even more directly in the Charter of the Organization of
American States (O.A.S. Charter)." Among the principles espoused by
the document is that "every state . . . has the duty to abstain from
intervening in the affairs of another state."' 0 No means limitation is
included; any form of intervention is deplored.61
The chapter on the Fundamental Rights and Duties of States
further declares:
Article 14. The right of each State to protect itself and live
its own life does not authorize it to commit unjust acts
against another State.
Article 18. No State or group of States has the right to
intervene, directly or indirectly, for any reason whatever,
in the internal or external affairs of any other State. The
foregoing principle prohibits not only armed force but also
any other form of interference or attempted threat against
the personality of the State or against the political,
economic, and cultural elements.
Article 19. No State may use or encourage the use of
coercive measures of an economic or political character in
order to force the sovereign will of another State and
obtain from it advantages of any kind.
58. Joint Communique Between The United States and Cuba, supra note 41.
59. O.A.S. CHARTER art. 3, para. (e).
60. Id.
61. Id.
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Article 20. The territory of another State is inviolable; it
may not be the object, even temporarily, of military
occupation or of other measures of force taken by another
State, directly or indirectly, on any grounds whatever. No
territorial advantages or special acquisitions obtained either
by force or by other means of coercion shall be
recognized.62
Each article is specific in its prohibition against intervention by
another state. This is a more expansive view than the U.N. Charter, 3 yet
one which the American States, including Cuba, opted for in signing the
O.A.S. Charter in 1951." The norms which this document promotes are
those of negotiation and mediation. States in the O.A.S. system are duty
bound to discuss their disagreements and to try to gain the alteration of
another state's policies through diplomacy rather than coercion. 6
Cuba's actions clearly violated a number of the listed precepts.
First, though it is surely understated, Cuba's promotion of a vast exodus of
refugees by opening its borders is an unjust act within the meaning of
article 14." Any violations of the articles which follow would, a priori,
violate the prohibition on unjust acts.61
Articles 18 and 19 are more explicit. The right to intervene is
prohibited, not only in terms of armed force, but in any other form of
interference. Any subornation of another state's sovereign will, any
pressure applied in a coercive fashion that brings about an alteration of
another state's policies by interference in that state's internal affairs, is
prohibited.6a
62. Id. at arts. 14-20.
63. U.N. CHARTER an. 2, para. 4.
64. O.A.S. CHARTER art. 3, para. (e).
65. Id.
66. Id. at art. 14.
67. Id.
68. The obvious reply would be that the United States itself is violating the O.A.S. Charter
in sustaining its embargo against Cuba, and thus has forfeited a defense against Cuba's violations.
While this line of argument is beyond the scope of this article, several points are worthy of note.
In general, internal embargoes of a country's goods and services would not seem to
violate international law as sovereign states have the power (as an element of their sovereignty) to
exclude the entry of any material from their territory. While the effects of an embargo will
certainly vary from country to country, especially in light of a difference in size of the economy
to which a country is denied access, such variations alone should not alter the nature of state
sovereignty. Thus, while an embargo by the United Sates would certainly have a greater effect
on Cuba's economy than an embargo by Jamaica, the effect of the embargo alone should not
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Cuba's violation of such precepts is distinct. When one acts with
the knowledge that one's actions will lead to a certain result, one is as
much responsible for that result as for the initial acts. Cuba opened its
borders knowing that a mass exodus would ensue. It successfully used this
result as a bargaining chip to force the United States to alter its
immigration policies. This was an "advantage gained"69 within the
meaning of article 19, and the act itself fits easily within the broad scope
of article 18.0
Article 20 deals with territorial violations. This section also refers
to territorial violations not caused merely by the use of force, but by any
"other means of coercion."' , Under this language, using refugees is as
sure a violation as using an army. The section does not limit the illegality
of territorial violations merely to those bent on acquiring land, but extends
such condemnation to any "special advantage"" gained by the territorial
violation. Would anyone seriously claim that the alteration of another
state's immigration policy (or any other political policy) is not an
advantage?
Lest we think that these two documents are isolated post-war
relics, and that the community of nations has since been less concerned
with intervention, let us examine more recent materials.
Fourteen years after the signing of the O.A.S. Charter, the
principle of non intervention was reinforced by the 1965 United Nations
General Assembly Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in the
Domestic Affairs of States and the Protection of their Independence and
Sovereignty." This declaration recognized "that full observance of the
principle of non intervention in the internal or external affairs of other
states is essential to the fulfillment of the purposes and principles of the
United Nations."" The document declared that:
No State has the right to intervene, directly or indirectly,
for any reason whatever, in the internal or external affairs
of any other State. Consequently, armed intervention and
determine its legality. For a concise discussion of this topic, see 2 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC
INTERNATIONAL LAW 58-67 (1995).
69. O.A.S. CHARTER art. 19.
70. Id. at art. 18.
71. Id. at art. 20.
72. Id.
73. Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of States and
the Protection of their Independence and Sovereignty, G.A. Res. 2131, U.N. GAOR, Dec. 21,
1965 (hereinafter Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention].
74. Id.
1996]
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all other forms of interference or attempted threats against
the personality of the State or against its political,
economic and cultural elements, are condemned."
Drawing on language almost identical to the O.A.S Charter, 6 the
Declaration" prohibits direct or indirect intervention to obtain advantages
of any kind.'"
As an even more recent example, the World Court cited the
principle of non intervention in its 1986 ruling against the United States for
the mining of Nicaraguan harbors. 9 Citing the principle as an element of
customary international law, the court defined the principle as follows:
A prohibited intervention must be bearing on matters in
which each state is permitted, by the principle of State
sovereignty, to decide freely (for example the choice of a
political, economic, social and cultural system, and
formulation of foreign policy). Intervention is wrongful
when it uses, in regard to such choices, methods of
coercion ....
The principle of non intervention remains the norm in international
law. It matters little whether the tool used is an invasion force, the
dropping of leaflets from planes, or the flooding of a nation with refugees.
If such measures are used in an attempt to influence another nation's
policies, then such measures are condemned by international law. Yet the
use of refugees as a tool of foreign influence is hardly reprehensible
merely because of the alteration of a nation's immigration quotas. What is
truly unfortunate is the human cost of such a ploy. The second segment of
international law violated when states use refugees in this manner is the
violation of the rights of the refugees themselves under various human
rights accords.
Once again, one must begin with the Charter of the United
Nations.' One of the purposes of the Organization, set out in article 1,.
section 3, is "promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for
75. Id.
76. O.A.S. CHARTER arts. 18-20.
77. Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention, supra note 73.
78. Id.
79. Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 1.C.J. 4 (June 27) (separate
opinion of Judge Ago).
80. Id.
81. U.N. CHARTER.
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fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language,
or religion." 2
This language is used yet again in article 55, section c, of the
Charter. This section declares that "the United Nations shall promote...
universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental
freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or
religion."83 This section converts the mere purpose" of article 1 into an
affirmative duty on the part of the Organization to promote3 human rights.
Although these statements are written in terms of the Organization,
individual Member States have pledged, in article 56, to "take joint and
separate action in cooperation with the Organization for the achievement of
the purposes set forth in Article 55."86
These passages establish a duty on the part of Cuba to promote
human rights. One must now determine what those rights are. The
starting point is the Universal Declaration of Human Rights," in
conjunction with the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights."8
At the time of its adoption, the Universal Declaration was
technically a non binding statement of principles. Yet, few today would
consider a deviation from the precepts espoused in this document as
anything other than a violation of international law. The Universal
Declaration is viewed either as the authoritative interpretation of the rather
open ended human rights clauses in the U.N. Charter, 9 or as a codification
which through consistent citation, espousal, and adherence over the past
forty-seven years has attained the status of customary international law.' °
Cuba is not a party to the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (ICCPR)." Thus, the ICCPR binds Cuba only to the
extent that its provisions have become customary law through the practice
82. U.N. CHARTER art. 1, para. 3.
83. U.N. CHARTER art. 55, para.(c).
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. U.N. CHARTER art. 56.
87. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 71, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., art. 3,
U.N. Doc. A/1810 (1948).
88. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted Dec. 16, 1966, 999
U.N.T.S. 171, art. 6, para. 1 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976) [hereinafter ICCPRJ.
89. U.N. CHARTER art. 1.
90. For a fine, concise discussion of this topic see THOMAS BUERGENTHAL,
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN A NUTSHELL 29-33 (1988).
91. ICCPR, supra note 88.
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of states. 9 As the provisions in this document mirror, to a large extent,
those in the Universal Declaration, the relevant articles of the ICCPR are
included for reference.
The most basic right set out in both the Universal Declaration and
the ICCPR is the right to life. Article 3 of the Universal Declaration states
that "everyone has the right to life, liberty, and the security of person."93
The covenant is even more explicit, stating in article 6, section 1, that
"every human being has the inherent right to life. This right shall be
protected by law. No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his life."9' Can
one seriously argue that in encouraging refugees to take to the sea in
makeshift rafts, Cuba demonstrated any concern for the sanctity of life?
Indeed, it is the depraved indifference Cuba demonstrated for those lost at
sea that constitutes the most serious violation of the human rights of those
who fled.
The next provision with potential applicability to the use of
refugees as foreign policy instruments is article 9 of the Universal
Declaration on Human Rights. This article states that "no one shall be
subjected to arbitrary arrest, detention, or exile." 9 While arbitrary arrests
and detentions are commonplace in Cuba and have definitely contributed to
the development of refugees, it is the final clause which concerns us here.
An individual faced with an array of human rights abuses, who seeks
refuge in a nation other than his own, is forced out of the nation of origin
as surely as if he were escorted to the dock at gunpoint. In fact, one might
see a ruthless nation in the future doing exactly that, marching refugees
over the border at gunpoint." We have already seen glimpses of such a
scenario in the acts of ethnic cleansing that have occurred in Bosnia, where
thousands of Muslim refugees have been forced out of Serb held territory.
While these actions have not been taken in order to influence another
nation's internal agenda, one could easily see such tactics, proven viable in
the current conflict, applied to such a purpose in the future.
Two further articles in these documents concern the freedom of
movement and residency in a state, article 13 of the Universal
Declaration'" and article 12 of the Covenant." Article 13 of the Universal
92. The ICCPR has over 114 States Parties, thus a good case may be made for its
provisions to have passed into the customary law of nations. Id.
93. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 87, at art. 3.
94. ICCPPk, supra note 88, at art. 6.
95. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 87, at art. 9.
96. O.A.S. CHARTER art. 20.
97. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 87, at art. 13.
98. ICCPR., supra note 88, at art. 12. See Mbitiru, infra note 127.
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Declaration states that "everyone has the right to freedom of movement
and residence within the borders of each state,"" and that "everyone has
the right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his
country. "'0
Article 12 of the Convention tracks the same rights. Section 1
provides for the rights of freedom of movement and freedom to choose
one's residence, and section 4 declares that no one shall be arbitrarily
deprived of the right to enter one's own country.10'
These rights have been violated by Cuba. The repressive
government which commits daily human rights abuses causes refugees to
leave their homes or suffer oppression. Given the opportunity to live in a
Cuba which did not repress individual liberties, most Cuban refugees
would do so.. Yet, this choice is denied to them. They may not live in
peace where they choose, they can only leave by taking life threatening
measures, and once they have departed they are denied the ability even to
visit their homeland, let alone resettle there.
The Universal Declaration provides, in article 15, that "everyone
has the right to a nationality,'10 and that "no one shall be arbitrarily
deprived of his nationality.",'
The use of refugees, including the intentional creation of
conditions which generate refugees and the subsequent capitalization of
such a resource, causes those used in such a manner to lose their
nationality. In being forced to seek refuge in a foreign land, individuals
are deprived of their citizenship, their heritage, and in some cases their
ethno-cultural identity. Living in Miami's Little Havana may imitate
aspects of Cuban culture, but it is not Cuba.
In addition to violating the human rights norms of the United
Nations, Cuba has violated the human rights provisions in the primary
regional instruments. These include the Charter of the Organization of
American States,'0 ' the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of
Man,' and the American Convention on Human Rights.9 0 Cuba is a party
99. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 87, at art. 13.
100. Id.
101. ICCPR, supra note 88, at art. 12, para. 1, 4.
102. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, supra note 87, at art. 15, §§ 1, 2.
103. Id.
104. O.A.S. CHARTER art. 3, para. (e).
105. American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, Resolution XXX, Final Act of
the Ninth International Conference of American States, art. 23 (1948), reprinted in
ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES, BASIC DOCUMENTS PERTAINING TO HUMAN RIGHTS IN
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to both the O.A.S. Charter and the 1967 Protocol' °' which amended the
Charter. The Charter itself includes two distinct human rights provisions.
In article 3, section K, "the American States proclaim the fundamental
rights of the individual without distinction as to race, nationality, creed, or
sex." "' The second provision is article 16, which guarantees each state the
right to "develop its cultural, political, and economic life freely and
naturally,"'1' so long as "in this free development, the State shall respect
the rights of the individual and the principles of universal morality."" 0
These clauses establish the normative requirement that member states
respect human rights; yet, definitional content must be given to the rights
of the individual which are to be protected.
In order to define these rights, one may look to the two primary
sources of American human rights law: the American Declaration on the
Rights and Duties of Man,"' and the American Convention on Human
Rights.- The American Declaration was originally adopted as a non-
binding statement of principles."3 Yet, as with the Universal Declaration
in the U.N. system, constant citation of the document has rendered it the
authoritative interpretation of the Human Rights provisions in the O.A.S.
Charter.", This argument is even more firmly buttressed than its U.N.
system parallel, for the American Declaration is the legal code which the
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights applies in determining
whether member states have violated the O.A.S. Charter." 5
The Commission is a charter organ,' an arm of the O.A.S.
system, made thus by the Protocol of Buenos Aires"' which amended the
Charter in 1967. The charter governing the operations of the Commission
THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM, 18 OEA/Ser. L.V./ 11. 82 doc. 6 rev. 1 (1992) [hereinafter
American Declaration].
106. American Convention on Human Rights an. 4, para. 1, opened for signature Nov. 22,
1969, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, 9 I.L.M. 673 (1970) (entered into force July 18, 1978).
107. Protocol of Amendment to the Charter of the Organization of American States
("Protocol of Buenos Aires"), opened for signature Feb. 27, 1967, 21 U.S.T. 607 (entered into
force Feb. 27, 1970) [hereinafter Protocol].
108. O.A.S. CHARTER art. 3, para. (k),
109. Id. at art. 16.
110. Id.
111. American Declaration, supra note 105.
112. American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 106.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Protocol, supra note 107.
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defines human rights, in article 1, section 2, as follows: "1. The rights
set forth in the American Convention on Human Rights, in relation to the
States Parties thereto; 2. The rights set forth in the American Declaration
of the rights and Duties of Man, in relation to the other member states."',
The Inter-American Court of Human Rights acknowledged the
normative status of the American Declaration when it declared "for the
member states of the Organization, the Declaration is the text that defines
the human rights referred to in the Charter. . . .The Declaration is for
those States a source of international obligations related to the Charter of
the Organization. ""9 In the same opinion, the court found the normative
character of the Declaration supported by the practice of the Member
States of the Organization.'"
Cuba is not a party to the American Convention on Human Rights.
Its provisions are thus binding on Cuba only to the extent that they have,
through the practice of a vast majority of the states in the region, become
customary international law. Since the provisions of the convention which
concern us in this instance mirror similar provisions in the American
Declaration,21 which as demonstrated above are binding on Cuba, they will
be included for reference. The rights proclaimed in the American system
match those rights guaranteed in the United Nations system.
The first of these rights is the right to life. Both article I of the
American Declaration, and article 4, paragraph 1, of the Convention
expound this fundamental principle.' Both documents track the right of
an individual to fix his residence, the right to move about a state freely,
and the right not to be forced to leave a state. '12 The Convention adds an
additional clause to the latter right, guaranteeing that "no one can be
expelled from the territory of a state of which he is a national or deprived
of the right to enter it."'" Both the American Declaration and the
118. O.A.S. CHARTER, art. 1, sec. 2.
119. Advisory Opinion No. OC-10/89, Interpretation of American Declaration of Rights
and Duties of Man Within Framework of Article 64 of American Convention on Human Rights,
1989 Inter-Am. C.H.R. (ser.A) No. 10, reprinted in 29 I.L.M. 379.
120. Id. at art. 1; American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 106, at art. 4, para.
1.
121. American Declaration, supra note 105.
122. Id. at art. 4, para. 1.
123. Id. at art. 8; American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 106, at art. 22, para.
124. American Convention on Human Rights, supra note 106, at art. 22, para. 5.
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American Convention grant the right to a nationality, in articles XIX and
20, respectively. 2,
All of the above rights have been violated by Cuba's use of
refugees in the same manner as Cuba violated the corresponding
provisions in the Universal Declaration and the ICCPR.
The foregoing lists of rights are merely those implicated by the
political use of refugees as foreign policy tools. In individual cases, such
as the sinking of the tugboat "13"' of March," broader and more direct
violations occur. Indeed, while the scope of review here must be limited
to those rights directly violated by the political use of refugees, the catalog
of violations responsible for creating a large enough group of refugees to
have an impact on another state's policies would inherently be much
greater than those violations implicated by the process itself.'12
VI. SECURITY CONCERNS
A nation inundated by refugees must deal with the economic and
political ramifications of their presence. These are obviously quite
formidable, and the major source of leverage for the state using refugees
as a foreign policy tool. Yet another, possibly overlooked, concern for the
receiving state involves the possibility of foreign agents entering its
borders, either among an uncontrolled population of refugees or posing as
refugees themselves.
Ask any Immigration & Naturalization Service (INS) officer who
has processed large groups of refugees, and he or she will admit to a
modicum of confusion in the process. Identity documents are often non
existent, and the past history of many refugees cannot be checked reliably.
This is the perfect situation for planting human intelligence operatives in a
nation. One could even plant refugees whose sole purpose would be to
arouse the anger of the local populace in order to create greater political
pressure to end a refugee crisis. Such action could give the government
who must deal with this pressure greater incentive to capitulate to the
nation that can alleviate such problems by halting the refugee flow.
Agents might raise the level of pressure by committing criminal
acts. As one can see from the outcry in the United States over the crime
rate among some of the Marielito population, criminal acts by refugees
125. American Declaration, supra note 105, at art. XIX; American Convention on Human
Rights, supra note 106, at art. 20.
126. For examples of such violations, see Cuba's Human Rights Abuses Under the U.N.
Spotlight, U.S. DEPT. ST. DISPATCH 54 (1989); Human Rights Situation in Cuba, U.S. DEPT.
ST. DISPATCH 41 (1989); and various Amnesty International, America's Watch, and Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights Country reports on Cuba.
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create major concern in the nation which harbors them. One could even
envision a nation dealing with such criminal actors by returning the
criminals to their country of origin. The criminals, in reality agents,
would be welcomed home to a vacation instead of a jail sentence.
Agents installed in a nation through refugee infiltration might also
gather valuable information on the expatriate population, which often
contains elements working for the end of the totalitarian regime. In a
multicultural society, with the attending ethnic groups, agent agitators
could stir up racial or ethnic tensions. The use of refugee politics offers
totalitarian nations many opportunities to sow dissension in neighboring
countries above and beyond the inherent strain caused by the actual
refugees.
VII. CONCLUSION
Imagine a scenario in which the totalitarian government of North
Korea announces, with great fanfare and to much acclaim, that it is
dismantling its fortifications along the Demilitarized Zone and withdrawing
its troops stationed there. South Korea and the United States, though
suspicious, follow suit. A great victory for peace is proclaimed, though
the border is still guarded and free movement between the two nations is
nonexistent.
North Korea then begins trade and development talks with its
southern neighbor while maintaining strict control of its internal
population. At some point an impasse is reached, whether it be over the
access to nuclear technology or over development assistance. The North
expresses its disappointment and opens its borders. A large number of
refugees spill into South Korea, causing immense political and economic
difficulties. South Korea quickly capitulates, and the North Korean border
guards return to their posts.
Does such a scenario sound far fetched? Admittedly, such
coercive measures would only be effective if a large enough stockpile of
potential refugees were present in a state, and then such techniques would
only be effective against nations which the refugees could reach. Thus,
the use of refugees as a foreign policy tool by Iraq might have
considerable impact on Kuwait, Jordan, or Turkey, but could hardly
coerce the United States into concessions.
Such scenarios are gruesome. Yet countries such as Cuba, North
Korea, Iraq, or Myanmar (Burma), ruled by self interested totalitarian
regimes, might resort to such measures to attain specific policy alterations
from neighboring states. This is especially true when the neighboring
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states are either wealthy or democratic. It is in such states that refugee
tactics would have the greatest impact.
It is unlikely that flooding an adjacent totalitarian regime would
have the desired effect. First, the likelihood of an armed response is much
greater from such outlaw nations than from democratic states, in which
political outrage to such a response would generate internal debate.
Second, it is quite possible that a neighboring totalitarian nation might
merely round up refugees and march them back across the border at gun
point,2'. Third, there is always the possibility of such a state using its own
refugees in the same manner to achieve its foreign policy objectives.
Does the world really need to see such tactics become a repeated
reality before taking action? Of course not. There are several measures
the United Nations, or appropriate regional bodies, could take in order to
prevent the future use of refugees as foreign policy tools.
The first step might be a United Nations General Assembly (or
regional assembly) resolution declaring such actions unlawful. Public
condemnation of this sort is not legally binding, but can still be effective.
Such a declaration should be worded strongly and should encourage
Member States to consider a state's use of refugee politics when setting
their own foreign aid agendas.
A more concrete, yet more difficult measure would be the
negotiation and adoption of a separate convention aimed at eliminating the
use of refugees as foreign policy tools. The difficulty with this course of
action is that it is highly unlikely that a problem state would become a
party to such a treaty, and would thus escape any enforcement mechanisms
such a treaty might contain. The positive aspect of such a treaty is that it
would begin the process of condemnation required to outlaw the political
use of refugees under customary international law.
A more controversial proposal would be for the use of refugees to
be included in the Definition of Aggression expounded by the United
Nations General Assembly.Iu By including the use of refugees in the
definition of physical aggression, a right of self-defense under article 51 of
the U.N. Charter would vest in the state thus invaded.' 29 This would make
the threat of military retribution by such states both legal and viable. The
127. The August 1995 expulsion/repatriation of thousands of Rwandan refugees by the
government of Zaire, carried out by its military, stands as evidence that such actions occur. See
Chege Mbitiru, Zaire Expels Rwanda Refugees, TACOMA MORNING NEWS TRIB., Aug. 23, 1995.
at A18.
128. Resolution on the Definition of Aggression, Dec. 14, 1974, G.A. Res. 3314 (XXIX),
U.N. GAOR, Supp. No. 31, at 142, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1975), reprinted in 13 I.L.M. 710
(1974).
129. U.N. CHARTER art. 51.
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ability to respond using military force might deter the active use of
refugees in the first place, though admittedly the practice of such a military
response would be horrific.
Along the same lines, were the United Nations Security Council to
authorize global intervention or sanctions to prevent a totalitarian regime
from using refugees as foreign policy tools, perhaps that example might
discourage similar tactics by other governments. Given the political nature
of the United Nations security body, this is highly unlikely to occur, unless
the humanitarian nature of the crisis were of extreme proportions, or
unless the national interests of the Member States on the Security Council
were somehow threatened.
Finally, perhaps the solution with the greatest long term chance of
success, and with the least destructive application, is simply to continue to
promote democracy and human rights on a worldwide scale, so that outlaw
nations with large populations of potential refugees cease to exist. This
may seem simple, obvious, and unlikely to show immediate results. Yet,
who would have thought in the mid-1980s that a decade later, many
totalitarian regimes in Eastern Europe, Latin America, and Southern
Africa would have crumbled and consequently millions of people would
begin to enjoy freedom and democracy.
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